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PUBLIC UTILITIES-THE AFTERMATH OF THE HOPE
CASE IN KENTUCKY (IH)"
Not only has the celebrated Hope case1 had a noticeable effect
upon rate determination of public utilities by federal agencies, but it
has also had an impact upon rate determination by state commissions.
It is true that state public service commissions still adhere to the
various traditional rate-making formulae, but the Hope decision has
been used by several state commissions, including Kentucky, as a basis
for moving away from the "fair value" rule as embodied in Smyth v.
Ames.2 The present attitude of the Kentucky Public Service Commis-
sion and Court of Appeals3 toward the valuation of property in a
utility rate case in Kentucky will be considered in this note as well as
the question of whether or not the Kentucky Commission may use the
decision in Hope as a means of avoiding "fair value" in view of the
Kentucky Public Service Act.4
The various state court decisions since the Hope case have been
grouped into four categories: (1) those continuing their pre-HTope
policy of original cost or prudent investment; (2) those faithful to
the fair value rule despite the opportunity offered by the Hope case;
(3) those adopting a cost method, though ostensibly adhering to the
fair value rule; (4) decisions explicitly adopting either original cost or
prudent investment as a result of Hope.5 Kentucky has been placed
in category (3), which includes those states that have adopted original
cost as the measure of fair value after the Hope case.6
* This note, primarily concerned with the rate base problem as it is presented
to Kentucky courts, is Part 11 of a two-part survey. Part I, which appeared in the
Winter issue of the Kentucky Law Journal, treated the rate base problem from
a federal and Supreme Court perspective.
I Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
2 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
3 The Court of Appeals has decided very few rate cases in which property
valuation has been the subject of the litigation. However, the Court has ap-
proved the Commission's sole use of original cost in determining the rate base.
Citizens Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 247 S.W. 2d 510 (Ky.
1952).
4 Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 278.290:
".... the Commission may ascertain and fix the value of the whole or
any part of the property of any utility in so far as the value is material
to the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Commission, and may make
revaluations from time to time and ascertain the value of all new
constrnction, extensions and additions to the property of the utility.
In fixing the value of any property under this subsection, the Com-
mission shall give due consideration to the history and development
of the utility and its property, original cost, cost of reproduction as
a going concern, capital structure, and other elements of value
recognized by the law of the land for rate-making purposes."
5 Rose, "The Hope Case and Public Utility Valuation in the States,' 54
Colum. L. Rev. 188, 190 (1954).
a id. at 200.
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It is clear from the language employed in the Kentucky Public
Service Act that the legislature adopted the fair value rule set forth in
the Smyth case.7 Although the Commission is aware of the portion of
the Public Service Act requiring it to use fair value as one of the ele-
ments in determining rates, s it has nevertheless displayed nothing but
hostility to reproduction cost new. In one of the first of its determina-
tions after the Hope case, the Commisison rejected evidence of repro-
duction cost new because it was not clear whether reproduction prices
were based upon present-day costs for single units or for quantity lots."
At the same time the Commission also expressed disapproval of repro-
duction cost new when it said:
A great deal of [the property] ... has been in service for more than
thirty years and is so obsolete that it cannot be reproduced from pur-
chases in the open market any more than a '1918 Model " can be so
purchased. Consequently, any reproduction cost study predicated
upon replacing the existing plant in every identical detail is bound
to descend from mere guesswork to pure speculation and to become
too unrealistic to carry any considerable weight in calculating a rate
base.O
The Commission has further stated:
The determination of existing depreciation is also a speculative matter.
How can one determine the depreciation that has taken place in an
electric light bulb that is still burning?"1
The above statements are only a few of many which are indicative
of the Commission's hostility to reproduction cost new. As a result of
this hostility the Commission has modified the traditional concept of
fair value by giving mere lip-service to the reproduction new require-
ment of the statute12 while placing the greater emphasis upon original
cost, or even by using original cost as the only element of fair value.
This result has been approved by the Court of Appeals.'8
7 The Commission, in fixing the value of utility property, is required to give
due consideration to (1) the history and development of the utility and its prop-
erty, (2) original cost, (3) cost of reproduction as a going concern, and (4) other
elements of value recognized by the law of the land for rate-making purposes.
This is essentially the same formula set forth in Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466,
546-47 (1898).8 Re Lexington Telephone Company, 75 P.U.R. (n.s.) 1, 8 (Ky. P.S.C. 1948).
9 Re Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 76 P.U.R. (n.s.) 33 (Ky.
P.S.C. 1948).
10 Id. at 39.
11 Re Citizens Telephone Co., 83 P.U.R. (n.s.) 129, 136 (Ky. P.S.C. 1950).
12 Re Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 6 P.U.R. 3rd 18 (Ky.
P.S.C. 1954); Re Western Kentucky Gas Co., 98 P.U.R. (n.s.) 90 (Ky. P.S.C.
1953); Re United Fuel Gas Co., 95 P.U.R. (n.s.) 65 (Ky. P.S.C. 1952); Re Ash-
land Home Telephone Co., 90 P.U.R. (n.s.) 16 (Ky. P.S.C. 1951).




The opponents of reproduction cost new advance the theory that
utility property is not freely bought or sold on the open market, and,
therefore, is not the type of property ordinarily considered to have an
exchange value and so any estimate as to its reproduction cost must
be established by opinion evidence, which necessarily involves a cer-
tain amount of speculation.' 4 This is a diffculty that has been recog-
nized by Chief Justice Hughes, but he concluded that this did not
justify its rejection:
... [Tihe criteria at hand for ascertaining market value, or what is
called exchange value, are not commonly available. The property is
not ordinarily the subject of barter and sale and, when rates them-
selves are in dispute, earnings produced by rates do not afford a
standard for decision. The value of the property or rate base, must
be determined under these inescapable limitations.15 (Italics added)
Thus, it would seem that the weaknesses of reproduction cost do not
justify the complete disregard of that element of the rate base, par-
ticularly since these weaknesses were obviously known by the Ken-
tucky Legislature at the time reproduction cost new was included in
the rate base formula.
The Kentucky Commission, as previously pointed out, has rejected
reproduction cost new as a method of evaluating utility property for
rate-making purposes as being too conjectural and unworkable. The
rationalization for this result has been grounded on the decisions of
Hope and Canadian River Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission.'6
In the latter case the Federal Power Commission rejected evidence of
reproduction cost new saying the estimates were too conjectural to
have probative value and adopted original cost as the only reliable
evidence as to property values. Of course, this result was in keeping
with the Hope case, which permits the use of a rate base other than
fair value, if the Legislature chooses, in so far as the Federal Constitu-
tion is concerned. However, if the state legislature has set forth specific
statutory standards prescribing the method by which the rate base is
to be determined, then the state commission is not free to resort to
Hope but is bound to adhere to the state statute.'7 It has been said
that:
The effect of ... [the Hope] decision is to free the state commissions
so far as the federal constitution is concerned from any restrictions
in their choice of a rate base. It follows that these commissions need
14 Los Angeles Gas and Electric Corp. v. Railroad Commission of California,
289 U.S. 287 (1933).15 Id. at 305.
16 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
17 Joslin and Miller, 'Public Utility Rate Regulation: A Re-Examination," 43
Va. L. Rev. 1027, 1048-49 (1957).
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conform only to their state laws in establishing property valuations
for rate maling purposes, and that the state legislatures may in their
discretion prescribe fair value, prudent investment or any other rate
base.1S
Thus, it would seem that the Kentucky Public Service Commission is
in error in rejecting evidence of reproduction cost as required by the
state statute and by relying solely upon original cost as the method for
property valuation. In so doing the Commission is equating the word
"value" only with "original cost." This cannot logically be done when
the legislature has specifically stated that "value" also includes "repro-
duction cost new."19
The conclusion that the Commission is in error in rejecting evidence
of reproduction cost new is further strengthened by the fact that the
Kentucky Legislature has taken no action to change the statute. Ken-
tucky's first Public Service Act was enacted in 1934. This Act was
subsequently amended in 1952, but the Amendment did not change in
any manner the formula regarding property valuation but merely com-
bined two statutes into one.20 It can be properly assumed that in 1952,
some eight years after the Hope decision the legislature was familiar
with both the .economic theories concerning rate making and the
opportunities offered by Hope. Therefore, the failure of the legis-
lature to act when it amended the statute in 1952 is of the utmost im-
portance in formulating the legislative intent in regard to rate-making.
The legislature was then free to adopt some other standard other than
fair value, but it chose not to do so, and its choice must be given
significance.
It must be remembered that rate-making is essentially a legislative
act2' and that the Commission, a statutory creature, is bound to fol-
low the statutes of the legislature.22 Merely giving lip-service to a
legislative mandate and then proceeding to adopt a less burdensome
formula does not satisfy either the letter or the spirit of the law. For
the Commission to base its determination solely upon the capital
actually expended, without considering the reproduction cost of the
property actually used in the public service, amounts to legislation.
This is beyond the power of both the Commission and the Court of
Appeals.
Nor can it be logically argued that the legislature abandoned its
previous position when the Hope decision was advanced, since exist-
18 Rose, "The Bell Telephone System Rate Cases," 37 Va. L. Rev. 699, 701-02
(1951).
39 See note 4 supra.
2o Ky. Rev. Stat. see. 278.290.
21 Joslin and Miller, supra note 17, at 1037.
22 Re Lexington Telephone Co., 75 P.U.R. (n.s.) 1 (Ky. P.S.C. 1948).
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ing legislation was not changed after the Hope decision. If the legisla-
ture had in fact changed its position it seems that it would have done
so in a clear and convincing manner, especially in 1952 when it took
the time to amend the Public Service Act.
A situation comparable to that in Kentucky existed in New York
prior to the decision of New York Telephone Co. v. Public Service
Commission.2 3 In that case the Commission had denied the application
of the New York Telephone Company for an increase in telephone
rates amounting annually to $68,850,000. Petitioner's claim of error was
that the Commission refused to receive evidence of the alleged present
value of its property actually used in the public service. This claim of
error was based entirely on statutory language contained in sec. 97(1)
of the Public Service Law, which provides that the determination of
rates is to be made 'with due regard, among other things, to a reason-
able average return upon the value of the property actually used in
the public service."24 Petitioner contended that this language was
mandatory and therefore required the Commission to adopt a present
fair value rate base. The Commission, on the other hand, contended
that the language quoted was merely an historical accident and, there-
fore, without significance. The Commission further contended that
present fair value as a rate base was abandoned as a constitutional
requirement as a result of the Hope case.2 5 The New York court held
that the exclusion of evidence which would have been material in the
computation of a fair value rate base was reversible error since repro-
duction cost less depreciation was an indispensable ingredient to be
considered in fixing the present value of utility property. The court
further stated that the Hope case did not free the Commission from the
use of the legislative formula and that the legislature had shown no
sign of abandoning fair value.
The Kentucky Commission and the Court of Appeals would do
well to decide the next Kentucky rate case in light of this New York
opinion.
There are at least three interests that must be protected in every
rate case. These are the interests of the consumer, the public, and the
utility, which includes the investor.26 This note is not designed nor
intended to be too favorable to the utility interest but at times in
recent years it seems that the utility and the Commission have become
adversaries, and a definite note of antagonism has been detected.2 7 It
23 286 App. Div. 28, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 68 (1955).
24N. Y. Public Service Law sec. 97(1).
25 New York Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 286 App. Div. 28,
142 N.Y.S. 2d 68 (1955).26 Joslin and Miller, supra note 17, at 1035. 27 Id. at 1026.
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must be remembered that there has been a tremendous increase in
both consumers and technological advancements. In order to supply
the needs of the increasing consumer and to keep pace with tech-
nological advances and maintain the present plant, all of which the
public interest demands, the utility must obtain hugh sums of money.
Such sums cannot be obtained if the utility is continually regulated "in
this post-1945 era under guiding principles and concepts which had
their inception during a period of time when both the economic, social,
and legal conditions differed markedly from those existing cur-
rently."28
The sole use of original cost is certainly unfair to the utility and its
investors since most utility plants were built during a time when eco-
nomic conditions were much lower than today. On the other hand,
the sole use of reproduction cost new would not be feasible since this
would favor the utility and result in exorbitant rates. The desirable
situation as far as result is concerned would be a reconciliation of the
two theories of rate-making, with both clearly reflected in the rate base.
The use of reproduction cost new might possibly lengthen the de-
termination process, but this fact should not discourage its use since
it is vitally necessary to the protection of all interests concerned. Of
course, the ideal solution would be to develop an entirely new system
of rate-making, which state legislatures and state commissions, in
absence of specific statutory provisions, are now free to do under the
rule of the Hope case. But until a more satisfactory formula is found,
the reconciliation formula of original cost and reproduction cost new,
which is embodied in the Kentucky Public Service Act, should be
followed.
Glenn L. Greene, Jr.
28 Id. at 1033.
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